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In a recent tribute to legal scholars who emigrated from Germany to the
United States during the Nazi period,' no fewer than four contributors honored
Friedrich Kessler. One of them, Professor Herbert Bernstein of Duke
University Law School, focused on Kessler's impact on American legal
thought in general and contract law in particular.2 Two others had studied with
Kessler at Yale (Professor Otto Sandrock of Minster3) and Berkeley
(Professor Johannes Ktndgen of St. Gallen4). The editors had assigned to
them the task of documenting Kessler's importance for Germany. This proved
to be surprisingly difficult. Kessler had, from 1952 onward, published
continuously and visibly in Germany; 5 legions of younger and older academics
who took degrees or spent their sabbaticals in the United States came to know
his work. Those who attended his classes or discussed their research with him
testify as to how impressed they were by those encounters.6 Yet Kessler's
articles and arguments have rarely been integrated into the postwar legal
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1. DER ENFLUB DEUTSCHER EMIGRANTEN AUF DIE RECHTSENTWICKLUNG IN DEN USA UN) IN
DEurSCHLAND (Marcus Lutter et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter DER EINFLUB DEJTsmcIER ExMIGRANTEN].
2. Herbert Bernstein, Friedrich Kessler's American Scholarship and Its Politcal Subtext. in DER
EINFLUB DELrUSCHER EMIGRANTEN, supra note I. at 85; see also JurrA KiAPILsCI. DER EINFLUO DER
DEUTSCHEN UND bS'ERREICHISCHEN EMIGRANTrEN AUF CONTRACTS OF ADHESION AND BARGAINING IN
GOOD FAITH IM US-AMERIKANISCHEN RECHT (1991).
3. Otto Sandrock, Friedrich Kessler und das anglo-amerikanische Vertragsrecht. in DER ENFLUB
DEUTSCHER EMIGRANTEN, supra note I. at 475.
4. Johannes K6ndgen, Friedrich Kessler-Ein Grenzglinger zwischen den Disiplinen. in DER EINFLUB
DEIrSCHER EMIGRANTEN, supra note I. at 287.
5. See, e.g., Friedrich Kessler. Freiheit und Zwang im nordamerikantschen Verfragsrecht, in
FESTSCHRIFr FOR MARTIN WOLFF 67 (Ernst von Caemmerer et al. eds.. 1952); Friedrch Kessler, Einige
Betrachtungen zur Lehre von der Consideration. in I FEsTScHRIFr FOR ERNST RABEL 251 (Hans Dolle et
al. eds., 1954); Friedrich Kessler, Die soziale Funktion des Vertrages zugunsten Dritter im
nordamerikanischen Recht, in FESTSCHRIFr FOR EDUARD WAHL 81 (Klaus Mfller & Herman Soell eds..
1973); Friedrich Kessler, Der Konflikt zwischen Antitrustrecht und Vertragsfreiheit im Automobilvertraeb
im nordamerikanischen Rechr, in FSTSCHRIFr FOR LUDWIG RAIsER 437 (Fritz Bauer et al. eds.. 1974)
[hereinafter Kessler, Der Konflikt zwischen Antitrustrecht und Vertragsfreihet]; Friedrich Kessler. Der
Schutz des Vertrauens bei Vertragsverhandlungen in der neueren amerikanischen Rechisprechung. in
FESTSCHRwr FOR ERNST VON CAEMMERER 873 (Hans Claudius Ficker et al. eds.. 1978); Friednch Kessler.
Metamorphosen im amerikanischen Verrragsrecht. 43 JURISTEN ZErWUNG 109 (1988).
6. See, e.g., Otto Sandrock, Friedrich Kessler 80 Jahre. 36 JURISTEN ZrnNG 638 (1981).
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discourse of the Federal Republic.7 This author, the fourth contributor to the
collection, accordingly entitled his narrative "History as Non-History."' Must
we Germans simply appreciate Kessler's academic standing within the United
States and praise his contributions to comparative law? Or should his non-
history in Germany tell us a more disquieting story?
Three of Kessler's early American articles, published between 1941 and
1944, provide a provocative starting point for this analysis. The most famous
among them was Contracts of Adhesion, his philippic against the treatment of
standardized contracts by traditional law and doctrine. 9 That topic had already
been dealt with quite extensively in Germany. Kessler mentioned but one
contemporary, namely Ludwig Raiser, to whom he later dedicated an article
in his Festschrift.' Later American commentators did, however, detect
something unusual about Kessler's analysis." Why did he pay so little
attention to informational asymmetries, to the use of standardized forms within
highly competitive markets? Why did he instead focus on the insufficiencies
of contract law as indicating and contributing to "the obstruction of the
institutional framework of capitalist society";12 as enabling "enterprisers to
legislate in a substantially authoritarian manner"; and as a technique of
"powerful industrial and commercial overlords ... to impose a new feudal
order of their own making upon a host of vassals"? 3 I am not aware of any
American analysis that would have placed such emphasis upon links between
private governance structures, processes of economic concentration, and the
emergence of authoritarianism in the whole of society. 4
7. Notable exceptions include Spiros Simitis, Soll die Haftung des Produzenten gegenilber dem
Verbraucher durch Gesetz, kann sie durch richterliche Fortbildung des Rechts geordnet werden? In
welchem Sinne?, in 1 GUTACHTEN ZUM 47. DEtrSCHEN JURISTENTAo C. 4 (1968) (drawing extensively
upon Kessler's theory of enterprise liability); 2 WOLFGANG FIKENTSCHER, METHODEN DES RECHTS IN
VERGLEICHENDER DARSTELLUNG 141-42, 364-73, 417-19 (1975) (analyzing Kessler's theoretical
perspectives).
8. Christian Joerges, Geschichte alsNicht-Geschichte: Unterschiede und Ungleichzeitigkeiten zwischen
Friedrich Kessler und der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft, in DER EINFLUB DEUTSCHER EMIGRANTEN, supra
note 1, at 221, translated as Christian Joerges, History as Non-History: Points of Divergence and Time
Lags Between Friedrich Kessler and German Jurisprudence, 42 AM. J. CoMp. L. 163 (1994) [hereinafter
Joerges, History as Non-History]. These pages draw upon that article as well as on Christian Joerges, Die
Wissenschaft vom Privatrecht und der Nationalstant, in RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT IN DER BONNER REPUBLIK
311 (Dieter Simon ed., 1994); Christian Joerges, On the Context of German-American Debates on
Sociological Jurisprudence and Legal Criticism, 1993 EUR. Y.B. Soc. L. 403; Christian Joerges, Politiseho
Rechtstheorie and Critical Legal Studies, in CRITICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: AN AMERICAN-GERMAN DEDATE
597 (Christian Joerges & David M. Trubek eds., 1989).
9. Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM.
L. REv. 629 (1943) [hereinafter Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion].
10. Kessler, Der Konflikt zwischen Antitrustrecht und Vertragsfreiheit, supra note 5.
11. See George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual
Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 484-96 (1985); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of
Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1174, 1215-20 (1983).
12. Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion, supra note 9, at 641.
13. Id. at 640.
14. This holds true even for Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM.
L. REV. 603 (1943). Closest to Kessler's critique is Franz Neumann's seminal analysis of the use of general
clauses in German law. See Franz Neumann, Der Funktionswandel des Gesetzes im Recht der bllrgerlichen
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Kessler's concern with the political dangers of untamed economic power
must be interpreted in the dark light of long-standing German experience.
Since the Great Depression of 1873, the government had tolerated
noncompetitive economic structures and promoted self-organization of
industrial compounds; the judiciary had expressly legalized cartels. 5 Attempts
during the Weimar Republic to replace this system of "organized capitalism"
and to address the tensions between economic capitalism and political
democracy faltered, and were definitely brought to an end after the seizure of
power in 1933 by the Nazi regime. It was against this backdrop that formalism
in contract law and standardized terms came to have meaning for Kessler.
Other indicators of Kessler's concern for his German heritage can be found
in two theoretical essays, one published before and one published after
Contracts of Adhesion.'6 Both essays are somewhat holistic in their approach.
They contrast natural law tradition with positivism, reach back to the roots of
this dichotomy in Greek philosophy, Thomistic scholasticism, and early
modem social philosophy, and assess the impact of these perspectives on one
another over time. Kessler's analysis is clearly motivated by an attempt to
identify his own place within this intellectual landscape-a landscape
dominated by legal realism. Kessler stressed the links between that
movement's legal positivism and liberal social philosophy, and presented the
realist critique of formalism as a legitimate heir of the young Bentham's social
reformism. 17 This reading enabled him to deepen his critique of the inability
of formalism to perceive private instrumentalizations of legal freedoms and to
challenge the legality of politically authoritarian regimes." It also enabled
him to identify the values of political democracy, "supplemented by an
economic and social democracy,"' 9 as the normative basis of his search for
a unity of freedom and justice.
My reading of Kessler's early American articles and their messages cannot
but employ a comparative perspective. The framework of that perspective,
however, must differentiate between three stages of German history. Kessler
received his legal education during the Weimar Republic. In 1926, he joined
the recently founded Kaiser Wilhelm-Institut ftir Auslindisches und
Internationales Privatrecht (Institute for Foreign and International Private Law)
Gesellschaft, 6 ZEITsCHRIFr FOR SOZIALFORSCHUNG 542 (1937). cited in Friedrich Kessler, Natural Law.
Justice and Democracy-Some Reflections on Three Types of Thinking About Law and Justice, 19 TUL L
REv. 31, 48 n.52 (1944) [hereinafter Kessler, Natural Law],
15. See Judgment of Feb. 4, 1897, Reichsgericht IRG1. 38 Entscheidungen des Reichsgenchts in
Zivilsachen [RGZ] 155 (Ger.).
16. Friedrich Kessler, Theoretic Bases of Law. 9 U. CI. L. REV. 98 (1941); Kessler. Natural Law,
supra note 14.
17. See Kessler, Natural Law, supra note 14, at 49.
18. Id. at 52-54.
19. Id. at 60.
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in Berlin. Both his dissertation of 192820 and his "habilitation" of 193221
dealt with his special field of interest: American law. His habilitation, on
negligence in American tort law, laid proof of a promising modernist, whose
diligence must have been appreciated even by the Institute's great conservative
master, Ernst Rabel. Modernism, however, is a contextual concept. Kessler's
early German writings stood out through their choice of subjects and their
attention to foreign legal concepts. But they were strictly legal analyses, not
yet affected by, or at least not explicitly engaging in, theoretical queries.
Kessler's early American articles in that sense signal a clear break with his
own past and the kind of legal reasoning his academic training had cultivated.
His early American articles were at the same time a response to what had
happened within that academic milieu in the decade after Kessler's habilitation.
Academic performance during the Nazi period was certainly not uniform.
Universities continued to function, law professors continued to teach students,
books were still published and articles still written-even after the legislative
fiat of April 7, 1933, 2 which removed non-Aryans and newly defined
political enemies from academia. This action was extended in 1938, until
Germany's law faculties had lost thirty-six percent of their former academic
staff.' It would be in vain to search for something like a theoretical basis of
that legislation. Germany's National Socialism was not committed to a
particular philosophical or theoretical perspective. It was nevertheless a
political system, with a demand for the establishment of a world view
[Weltanschauung]-a renewal of law on the basis of a national-racial [vdlkisch]
ideal.' Some attempts to fill this void amounted to a hollow rephrasing of
Nazi phraseology. Others were more ambitious. The most important one in the
field of private law stemmed from Karl Larenz. 5 It is illuminating to contrast
Kessler's work with Larenz's. 26 Both writers dealt with the same topics. Both
were unsatisfied with legal formalism. Both viewed laissez-faire capitalism as
a betrayal of the common good. Both felt the need to search for a legal theory
beyond natural law and positivism.27 Yet their theoretical frameworks and
20. Friedrich Kessler, Uniform State Laws in den Vereinigten Staaten-Das Recht der Eheschlleflung,
I ZErTSCHRIFr FOR AUSLANDISCHES UND WrERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 185, 886 (1927).
21. FRIEDRICH KESSLER, DIE FAHRLASSIGKEIT IM NORDAMERIKANISCHEN DELIKTSRECHT UNTER
VERGLEICHENDER BEROCKSICHTIGUNG DES ENGLISCHEN UND DES DEUTSCHEN RECHTS (1932).
22. Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums, 1933 Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBI] I 175.
23. This figure is drawn from C. VON FERBER, DiE ENTWICKLUNG DES LEHRKORPERS DER DEUTSCHEN
UNIVERSrrATEN UND HOCHSCHULEN, 1864-1954, at 145 (1956).
24. See generally Carl Schmitt, Die deutsche Rechtswissenschaft im Kampf gegen den jtidischen Geist,
41 DEmTSCHE JuRisTEN-ZErrUNG 1193 (1936).
25. Larenz has only once, in a letter of February 15, 1987, addressed to Professor Ralf Dreier and
published posthumously with Larenz's consent in 48 JuRiSEN ZErrUNG 455-57 (1993). commented upon
his entanglement. He explains that he was persuaded in May 1933 to make the new regime understand
better the "idea of law and state" and then took over that task in the belief that such an effort might still
have an impact. For an enervated comment, see Horst Heinrich Jakobs, Karl Larenz und der
Nationalsozialismus, 48 JURISIEN ZErrUNG 805 (1993).
26. For an elaboration, see Joerges, History as Non-History, supra note 8, at 175-84.
27. See id. at 180.
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normative perspectives differed sharply. Larenz's perspective was grounded in
post-Hegelian objective idealism, while Kessler drew upon the philosophical
heritage of modem positivism and its dialogue with natural law. Larenz saw
"concrete orders" as ensuring the conformity of the exercise of individual
choices with the requirements of the whole Volk and its National Socialist
leadership, while, for Kessler, tensions between liberty and justice had to be
resolved by social reforms within the democratic process. Larenz emphasized
the unity of the individual will and the common will, with law ensured not by
any abstract principles but by a legislator whose own thought and volition
encompassed the German Volk's conception of law. Kessler cautioned that a
preoccupation with abstraction would take away from the important task of
testing out the desirability, efficiency, and fairness of inherited legal rules and
institutions in terms of the present needs of society.
Not only were Kessler's positions antithetical to those of his trend-setting
German contemporaries, his focus on American legal culture had at the same
time alienated him from a second German legal culture that had survived the
Nazi period. After the collapse of the Third Reich, that second culture was
again to become the first. How could it now reintegrate-or at least listen
to-its emigrds?
Germany's legal academy faced two challenges in the postwar period. It
had to look back and consider its involvement in National Socialism; it had to
look forward and contribute to the establishment of a new constitutional order.
The first task proved to be extremely painful and difficult. One easy answer
suggested itself: National Socialism had betrayed fundamental values; it had
identified the law with the will of tyranny. The inability to differentiate
between Gesetz and Recht, between arbitrary commands and the rule of law,
had contributed to the submissiveness of legal officials and judges. Should not
legal positivism take responsibility for these failures? This view was first and
most prominently advanced by Gustav Radbruch,2 whose voice was
important in light of both his personal integrity and his prior criticism of
natural law traditions. Radbruch's thesis was readily supported in many
quarters. Even law professors, whose involvement in the meta-positivist
National Socialist "renewal" was clearly documented, did not hesitate to
identify with the critique of positivism. 29 Kessler's articles from 1941 and
1943 had dealt extensively with this agenda. Yet they were not read, and
Kessler was not even mentioned in the first postwar review of modern
American jurisprudence-a review that betrayed great sympathy for the natural
28. See Gustav Radbruch, Gesetziches Unrecht und itbergesetzhches Recht. I SODDEurscHE Juiuse;-
ZEnrLrNG 105 (1946).
29. A particularly enlightening document is the Denkschrift der Letpziger Juristenfakultat of the year
1945, now published by Karl Michaelis, one of its authors, in 30 DER STAAT 81 (1991).
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law critique of the realist movement.3° Nevertheless, with a delay of some
decades, Kessler's insights into the practical weakness of natural law theories
and the philosophical foundations of positivism today are widely shared and
the Radbruch thesis is thoroughly discredited. 3'
The second postwar challenge concerned the future, but was equally
related to the past. The legal academy had to identify theoretical bases that
were uncompromised by Nazism and at the same time capable of addressing
the role of law in the new constitutional state. Again, Kessler had something
to offer. In 1952 he contributed to the Festschrift of Martin Wolff, once a
legendary member of the Humboldt University law faculty in Berlin who had
emigrated to Great Britain.32 Kessler's article foreshadowed the introductory
chapter of his casebook on contracts, coauthored with Malcolm Sharp in 1953.
It dealt with the coexistence of freedom and coercion in modern contract law,
contained a methodological and social critique of formalism, pointed to the
tensions and contradictions within the American legal system, and pleaded for
an articulated judicial policy. Germany's postwar jurisprudence was hardly
ready to appreciate such messages. On the contrary, Kessler's analysis and
normative perspectives were diametrically opposed to the most important
strands of legal thought in this phase of West Germany's reconsolidation. This
especially holds true for ordo-liberalism, first advanced by the economists
Walter Eucken and Alexander Riistow during the Weimar Republic, and
finding legal proponents and gaining intellectual leadership in the postwar
period.3 In this school, the rule of law was viewed as constituting both a
liberal economic and political order. Individual liberties and private law could
not be dispositive and their fundamental importance not even subjected to the
incalculable outcome of political processes. Ordo-liberalism was no less critical
of the formalist tradition than was Kessler's realism. But the two schools could
not become allies.
The second nonpositivist tradition that was to be revitalized had much
earlier roots. In the first half of the nineteenth century, when Germany began
to detect its nationhood without the prospect of becoming a unitary state and
French enlightenment stimulated quests for a modem codification of law, the
historical school had found its ingenious response: German identity was to be
based upon the culture and ethnicity that expressed itself in the Volksgeist;
legal unity could be achieved without the help of a legislature on the basis of
30. Helmut Coing, Neue Strimungen in der nordamerikanischen Rechtsphilosophie, 38 ARCHlIV FOR
RECHTS UND SOZLIALPHISOPHIE 536 (1949/50).
31. For an informative retrospective, see Ulfried Neumann, Rechtsphilosophie in Deutschland seit
1945, in REcHTSWiSSENScHAFr IN DER BONNER REPIUBIK, supra note 8, at 145.
32. Kessler, Freiheit und Zwang im nordamerikanischen Vertragsrecht, supra note 5.
33. Most notably Franz Bbhm; see his WM'BEWERB UND MONOPOLKAMPF (1933). Out of his early
postwar publications, see Die Bedeutung der Wirtschaftsordnung falr die politische Verfassung,




Roman law; this process of restructuring needed gifted representatives-learned
jurists who could synthesize Roman law sources with the Volksgeist into a new
doctrine. The great tradition of the historical school was still alive. But how
was it to cope with the kind of law that Kessler had presented to his German
readers?
So far my story has focused on Kessler's alienation from his German
heritage. The story could still be continued. One particularly interesting chapter
would have to deal with the student revolt in the 1960's against Germany's
tradition of legal education, and the rediscovery of Marxism and the emigrated
socialists of the Weimar Republic. Fortunately enough, my story is one-sided
and thus incomplete. German legal thought has undergone substantial change
despite the strength of its traditions. The constant confrontation with American
legal culture, to which Kessler has contributed so much, has promoted these
changes.
Kessler's work will continue to have tremendous importance for Germany,
as well as for Europe as a whole. Indeed, the project of European integration
and the debate over Europeanization of private law underscore the
contributions of Kessler's writings. Europe's internal market is widely
perceived as an economic project that necessitates the establishment of a range
of public law regulatory frameworks. The very fact that private law is
increasingly attracting attention, however, is illuminating enough. Assuming
that Europeans do not once more use ethnicity as a shield against legal integra-
tion, how should they come to grips with the differences in their legal cultures,
the many mandatory elements of private law, and even mere "default" rules?
Through a revitalization of legal formalism? Through a redetection of their
common Roman Law heritage? By establishing a European Privatrechtsgesell-
schaft, as recommended by German ordo-liberalism? Kessler's answers would
hardly be in the affirmative. Private law, he explained again and again, cannot
get rid of its regulatory side. Its dual commitment to freedom and social justice
needs to be based on commonly held values, on rationality-and on
democratically legitimized political processes. That diagnosis is as valid as it
was in the 1940's. It adequately describes the future European agenda.
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